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Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die
Issues Presented by Incompetent Patients with No
Prior Expression of a Treatment Preference
The medical field has continually expanded its ability to sustain a
patient in a condition that previously demarcated death.' Courts and
legislatures have grappled with the medical, legal, and ethical aspects of
when death occurs and what conditions justify the removal or with-
drawal 2 of life-sustaining procedures. In an attempt to clarify these ques-
tions, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School3 in 1968
provided criteria to determine brain death;4 this resulted in the adoption
I The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School asserted:
From ancient times down to the recent past it was clear that, when the respiration and heart
stopped, the brain would die in a few minutes; so that the obvious criterion of no heart beat
as synonymous with death was sufficiently accurate. In those times the heart was consid-
ered the central organ of the body; it is not surprising that it's failure marked the onset of
death. This is no longer valid when modern resuscitative and supportive measures are
used. These improved activities can now "restore" life as judged by the ancient standards
of persistent respiration and continuing heart beat. This can be the case even where there
is not the remotest possiblity of an individual recovering consciousness following massive
brain damage.
A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205J. A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968) [hereinafter AD Hoc COMMITTEE].
See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL,
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 1 (U.S.G.P.O., March, 1983) [hereinafter PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION] ("Frequent dramatic breakthroughs-insulin, antibiotics, resuscitation, chem-
otherapy, kidney dialysis, and organ transplantation to name a few-have made it possible to retard
and even reverse many conditions that were until recently regarded as fatal.").
2 In a right to die analysis, a distinction has arisen between euthanasia and antidysthanasia.
Euthanasia concerns "the act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incur-
able conditions or diseases." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (1986 una-
bridged). Antidysthanasia relates to the lack of positive action to prolong the life of an incurable
patient. Comment, The Right to Die-A Current Look, 30 Loy. L. REV. 139, 141 (1984). This distinc-
tion, while sometimes criticized as a slippery slope leading towards legalizing active euthanasia, es-
tablishes guidelines between permissible and impermissible actions. Id. See also In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 139, 660 P.2d 738, 757 (1983) (en banc); Comment, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV.
654, 657-62 (1970) (A legal as well as psychological distinction exists between actively killing an
individual and passively letting someone die.).
Modern medical practitioners do not differentiate between withdrawing medical treatment and
prospectively withholding the treatment in the first instance. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1,
at 73-77. Accord In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 369-70, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234 (1985); In re Grant, 109
Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445, 452 (1987) (en banc).
3 The Committee was comprised of ten physicians, a historian, a lawyer, and a theologian.
4 The brain is the human organ most sensitive to the absence of normal oxygenated blood flow.
As a result, it cannot regenerate destroyed tissue. The brain dies rapidly in the absence of a normal
heart beat and respiration. D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 24 (1981).
The human brain serves two distinct functions, vegetative and sapient. Vegetative regulation
controls body temperature, breathing, blood pressure to a considerable degree, and to some degree
the heart rate, chewing, swallowing, sleeping, and walking. The sapient function, the more highly
developed and uniquely human, controls our relations with the outside world. Both must die to
constitute brain death. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654-55 (citing expert testimony
of Dr. Fred Plum), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a discussion of how the cortex, which con-
trols the sapient functions, and the brain stem, which controls the vegatative functions, die, see D.
MEYERS, supra, at 24-25.
The Ad Hoc Committee Report stated that the following four general conditions constituted
brain death: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to pain or other stimuli; (2) no spontaneous move-
of state statutes which used these criteria as a model.5 In re Quinlan 6 and
its progeny, however, have demonstrated that such definitions of brain
death have failed to address the right to die issues presented by non-
brain dead patients in a persistently vegetative coma7 or in a conscious
state.
8
Although many states have passed Living Will Acts, which honor an
advance written declaration requesting the termination of life-sustaining
ments or breathing; (3) no reflexes; (4) two flat or isoelectric electroencephalograms (EEGs), mea-
sured twenty-four hours apart (demonstrating a nonfunctional higher and lower brain). AD Hoc
COMMrITEE, supra note 1, at 337-40. For a critique of the Harvard criteria, see D. MEYERS, supra, at
35-36.
5 The Uniform Determination of Death Act also recognizes the potential disparity between
modern technology and the common law's reliance on the cessation of spontaneous respiratory and
cardiac functions. It states that "[a]n individual who has sustained either (I) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with ac-
cepted medical standards." UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEaT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 292-93 (Supp.
1988).
State brain death legislation may be classified into three categories. First, some states follow the
Uniform Determination of Death Act and classify death as either the absence of respiratory and
cardiac function or the absence of brain function. Second, others view brain death as a means of
determining death when lack of respiration and circulation cannot be relied upon if maintained by
artificial respiration and circulation. Third, some states simply accept a total irreversible cessation of
brain functions alone to indicate death. See D. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 42-44; Comment, The Right to
Die-A Current Look, supra note 2, at 144; Note, Discontinuing Treatment of Comatose Patients Who Have Not
Executed Living Wills, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1985). See generally Abram, The Need for Uniform
Law on the Determination of Death, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1187 (1982).
The following state statutes attempt to demarcate the point when death occurs: ALA. CODE
§ 22-31-1 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 20-17-101 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West
Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-278(b) (West
1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 382.085 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327c-1(b)
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1987 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, para. 1302 (Smith-Hurd
1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-204 to 77-206 (1984);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2811 to 2813 (Supp.
1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202 (1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1021 (West
1980); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-36-1, 42-36-3 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (Vernon 1983);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 141-D:I to -D:2 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
323 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108 (Anderson 1987 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3121
to 3123 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10201-10203
(Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4-16 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-43-450, 44-43-460
(Law. Co-op. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1987); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t §§ I
to 3 (Vernon 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.7 (Supp. 1987);
W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-19-
101 to -103 (Supp. 1987).
6 70 N.J. 10, 366 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a discussion of In re Quinlan,
see infra notes 63-70 and 169-73 and accompanying text. The New Jersey Supreme Court recog-
nized that Karen Quinlan met none of the Harvard criteria. 70 N.J. at 27, 355 A.2d at 656. The
testimony before the court characterized her as in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at
654-55. For a discussion of such a condition, see infra note 7.
7 Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal
controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activ-
ity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral
evidence of either self awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (quoting Dr. Fred Plum, creator of the term "per-
sistent vegetative state") (citations ommitted).
8 See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d
1209 (1985); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987) (en banc).
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care,9 most persons fail to provide such a statement of intention. This
Note focuses upon the troubling questions presented by patients who
have never indicated a preference for or against life-sustaining treat-
ment, due to either life-long incompetence or oversight prior to becom-
ing incompetent. An incompetent patient is unable to formulate and
express a treatment choice; 10 as a result, a surrogate decisionmaker will
decide whether to terminate life-sustaining care." Medical treatment,
however, may not be withheld from an incompetent merely because a
surrogate believes that death would be the best alternative for that pa-
tient. Courts have recognized that under certain factual circumstances,
the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment may be in the pa-
tient's best interests, even though the incompetent had never previously
expressed his/her wishes about life-prolonging care. Decisions which
grant such incompetents the right to die have vacillated on the answers
9 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws has submitted a proposed
uniform act recognizing the enforceability of "living wills" under certain specified situations. UNIF.
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT, 9B U.L.A. 611 (1987).
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws in this area. ALA. CODE
§§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-320
to -3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-36-117 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.01-.15 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-4101 to -4112 (Harrison 1985 and Supp. 1987); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to D-27 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 and Supp.
1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, paras. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
8-11 -1 to -22 (West Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE §§ 144 A.I-A.I I (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,
101-109 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1986);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp.
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, 50-9-111, 50-9-201-206 (1987); NEv. REV. STAT.
§§ 449.540-.690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1-16 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-
7-2 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111
(West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-10-160 (1986);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1988); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-
5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-
.905 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.015 (West
Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986).
10 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 121. The individual lacks the capacity to under-
stand information relevant to the decision, to communicate with care givers about it, and to reason
about relevant alternatives against a background of reasonably stable personal values and life goals.
Courts presume patients are competent to make their own medical decisions. See Note, The
Conlfliet Continues: ['ho Decides Treatment Questions For the Terminally-Ill Incompetent Patient?, 23 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 641, 644 (1984).
For a summary of the various approaches to evaluate competency, see Mooney, Deciding Vot to
Resuscitate Hospital Patients: .Mledical and Legal Perspectives, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1079-80 n.341
(1986). Professor Mooney divides incompetency determinations into three categories. The first test
is an outcome approach, which focuses upon evidence of incompetence when decisions do not ad-
here to community values. The second test, the status approach, evaluates a person's individual or
mental status. Professor Mooney warns this standard is too broad. The third test bases its determi-
nation upon an individual's functional ability to make treatment choices. The President's Commis-
sion Report adopts this standard. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 122.
11 When a patient lacks the capacity to make a decision, a surrogate decision maker should
be designated. Ordinarily this will be the patient's next of kin, although it may be a close
friend or another relative if the responsible health professional judges that this other per-
son is in fact the best advocate for the patient's interests.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 126-27. See also D. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 113.
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to three essential questions: (1) what treatment should be withheld from
the incompetent patient; (2) what is the appropriate standard which the
surrogate decisionmaker should apply in assessing the treatment alterna-
tives; and (3) who is the appropriate surrogate to make the treatment
decision.
Part I of this Note traces the development of an incompetent pa-
tient's right to die based upon the common law right of bodily self deter-
mination and the constitutional right to privacy. Part II analyzes the
types of treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn, noting the contro-
versial questions concerning the removal of forced feeding devices. Part
III argues that, in cases where the incompetent patient failed to indicate a
treatment preference, it is impossible for the surrogate decisionmaker to
substitute his or her judgment for what the incompetent would have de-
sired in such a situation. Rather, the surrogate decisionmaker must eval-
uate whether it is in the best interests of the patient to terminate life-
sustaining care. To the extent possible, this analysis must incorporate
beliefs or traits of the particular patient as well as an evaluation of the
medical prognosis, rather than simply relying upon a "reasonable per-
son" standard. Part IV outlines the roles and responsibilities of the
primary decisionmakers of an incompetent patient without a prior treat-
ment preference-the family, the physicians, and 'the courts. It argues
that the proper persons to whom the law should delegate the treatment
decision are the patient's immediate family and attending physicians.
The degree of judicial involvement in the decision should be a function
of the patient's consciousness and prognosis. Part V concludes that by
allocating the decisionmaking responsibilities in the above manner, the
decision to terminate life-sustaining care will remain focused on the par-
ticular incompetent patient, rather than the preferences and needs of any
surrogates.
I. Foundations of an Incompetent's Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment
Courts have widely recognized that both competent1 2 and incompe-
tent patients have a right to terminate life-sustaining treatment. The
right to die derives from the guarantees afforded by the common law
right of bodily self determination' 3 and the constitutional right to pri-
12 The NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Farrel, 108 NJ. 335, 354 n.7, 529 A.2d 404, 413 n.7
(1987), stated that a competent patient possesses a "clear understanding of the nature of his or her
illness and prognosis, and of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, and has the capacity
to reason and make judgments about that information."
For cases upholding a competent patient's right to die, see Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Barling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 351, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978), cited with approval in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); ii re Reguena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886, aft'd, 213
NJ. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (1986). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 3 (recogniz-
ing the right of competent patient to forego life prolonging treatment).
13 See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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vacy.14 A compelling state interest, however, may necessitate the initia-
tion or continuation of life-sustaining care.' 5
A. Common Law Right of Bodily Self Determination
The common law respects the sanctity of life by allowing informed
decisionmaking, not by requiring or prohibiting medical care per se.
Nearly a century ago, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 16 the United
States Supreme Court upheld an individual's right to prevent noncon-
sensual bodily invasions. 17 In the context of medical treatment deci-
sions, the doctrine of informed consent safeguards this right of self
determination.18 The doctrine establishes the sovereignty of the patient
in decisionmaking. A patient should receive all pertinent information
concerning the risks and alternatives involved in the treatment.' 9 The
doctor's consultation also must disclose the consequences of foregoing
all care. 20 The patient's right to control bodily integrity pursuant to im-
plied consent includes the right to make an informed refusal. Although
an incompetent patient cannot evaluate treatment alternatives, the indi-
vidual's surrogate decisionmaker must receive the same consultation as a
competent patient would be afforded under such circumstances. In sum,
an incompetent possesses the same right to informed consent as a com-
petent patient, since any medical treatment will intrude upon the individ-
ual's bodily integrity. 21
14 See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
16 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
17 No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said
by Judge Cooley, "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immu-
nity: to be let alone."
Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
See also Schleordorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). Justice Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has the
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault."
Some state courts have found that this common law right in and of itself may protect an individ-
ual's right to refuse medical treatment. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223
(1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
18 A physician who acts without the patient's informed consent may face liability for battery or
negligence. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984). See also Cantor, A
Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment. Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Clark, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging
Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1980); Plant, An Analysis of "In-
formed Consent, " 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE
L.J. 1632 (1974).
19 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-7, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Care, 387 Mass. 152, 154, 439 N.E.2d 240,
242 (1982); Wilkenson v. Versey, 110 R.I. 606, 619, 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972).
20 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc)
("The purpose underlying the doctrine of informed consent is defeated somewhat if, after receiving
all information necessary to make an informed decision, the patient is forced to choose only from
alternative methods of treatment and precluded from foregoing all treatment whatsoever.").
21 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
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B. Constitutional Right to Privacy
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether the
constitutional right to privacy, which flows from either the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause or other constitutional penumbras, en-
compasses a person's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.22
State law, however, has recognized the constitutional rights of a patient
in authorizing the removal of life support systems. 23 In addition, the re-
cent decision in Gray v. Romeo 24 involves the first federal case to find that
the fourteenth amendment right to privacy is broad enough to include a
person's right to refuse medical treatment, even if death results.
In Gray, the United States District Court of Rhode Island relied upon
United States Supreme Court decisions that have repeatedly affirmed the
principle of bodily self determination. 25 The court, for example, cited
The recognition of that Right must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a com-
petent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both .... To protect the
incompetent person within its power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of
such a person and afford to that person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes
in competent persons.
Id. at 745-46, 370 N.E.2d at 427-28.
See also Note, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposalfor Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REv. 689,
704-05 (1987).
22 The United States Supreme Court has twice refused to address the right to die question. In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 422 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The Burger Court's decision not
to resolve this issue may have resulted from the former Chief Justice's strong belief that such an
issue involved a private matter, not cognizable by the courts. D. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 339 (citing
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (Burger, J., dissenting)).
23 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 335 A.2d 647, 662-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
involves the initial state court holding including the refusal of life-prolonging care under certain
circumstances protected by the right of privacy. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Superinten-
dent of Belcherton State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d. 417, 424 (1977),
shortly thereafter followed the Quinlan privacy analysis. See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz.
207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980);
In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (NJ. 1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445
(1987) (en banc); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (en banc). But see In're Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The New York
Court of Appeals stated uncertainty existed over whether or not the constitutional right to privacy
included the right to refuse life-sustaining care. The Storar court based its holding upon the pa-
tient's common law protections of bodily integrity. Id. at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
272-73. Contra In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (In-
competent patients do not lose their constitutional right to privacy merely because of incompetency.
Under certain circumstances a right to refuse life-prolonging or life-sustaining procedures may be
exercised in their behalf as an aspect of such right to privacy.).
24 697 F. Supp. 580 (D. R.I. 1988). The United States District Court of Rhode Island ordered
Rhode Island General Hospital to remove a feeding tube from Marcia Gray, comatose since January
1986, or transfer her to an institution that would carry out her family's wish that she be allowed to
die.
25 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(contraceptives); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Union Pacific Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250
(1891) (surgery choices).
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Roe v. Wade 26 to affirm the principle "that a person has the right ... to
control fundamental decisions involving his or her own body."' 27 Gray
acknowledged the Supreme Court's caution in Bowers v. Hardwick28
against an expansive interpretation of privacy rights. 29 The court recog-
nized that the right to privacy should encompass personal decisions
"implicit in our concept of ordered liberty" 30 or "those that are deeply
rooted in this nation's history and tradition." 3' As a result of our
nation's respect for the right to be free from nonconsensual bodily inva-
sions,3 2 Gray found an individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment to be consistent with the liberties protected by the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.33
C. Countervailing State Interests
In making any decision to terminate treatment, a patient's constitu-
tional right to privacy and common law guarantee against nonconsensual
bodily invasion must be balanced against the state's interests.3 4 Through
the parens patriae 35 power, states have articulated four interests in favor of
life-prolonging treatment: (1) the preservation of life;3 6 (2) the ethical
integrity of the medical profession;37 (3) the prevention of suicide;3 8 and
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27 697 F. Supp. at 585 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). See also P. RIGA, RIGrTo DIE
OR LIVE? 121 (1981). The author asserts that ending the fetus' life through an abortion is more
difficult to justify than permitting the refusal of treatment.
28 478 U.S. 186, reh 'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
29 The Court held that the right to privacy did not encompass consensual homosexual activity,
stating that sodomy bore no resemblence to family, marriage or procreation rights. Id. at 190-91.
30 697 F. Supp. at 584 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
31 Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
32 See supra note 25.
33 697 F. Supp. at 586 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV).
34 This balancing process has its historical roots in the "per legem terrae" clause of Magna Carta
which states "[N]o freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned or dispossed or outlawed or in any way
destroyed, nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, except by the legal judgment
of his peers or by the laws of the land." Magna Carta, Art. XXXIX.
35 The President's Commission describes parens patriae in the context of an incompetent's right
to die as including the following:
Civil courts .. .exercise the powers of parens patriae to protect individuals who cannot
adequately defend their own interests. In this role, courts are the final authority as to who
needs such protection, who should provide it (such as a guardian appointed for an incom-
petent patient), and what standards should be applied.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 39. See also In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 364-65, 486 A.2d
1209, 1231-32 (1985).
36 The State's interest in the preservation of life derives from "the broadest and most elemental
state power, the police power." Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). This power is a
"broad power, never precisely delimited, to take rational action for the protection of the public
safety, health, morals, comfort and good order." McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139
(1937). See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc).
The State's interest in preserving life is most compelling when treatment offers a cure or an-
other opportunity for normal, healthy, functionary life. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (1977); In re Dinnerstein, 6
Mass. App. 466, 472-73, 380 N.E.2d 134, 137-38 (1978). In Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers,
379 Mass. 255, 259, 399 N.E.2d. 452, 454 (1979), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
however, held that the State's interest in preserving life did not outweigh the right to refuse treat-
ment, although the dialysis treatment would have allowed the patient to lead a normal life.
37 In defining the integrity of the medical profession, a subtle distinction may be drawn between
instances in which withholding life-sustaining measures allows the disease to take its natural course
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(4) the protection of innocent third parties.39 Courts, however, have sel-
dom found the state interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the pa-
tient's right to forego treatment.40
II. What Treatment May Be Refused
A. Interpretative Difficulties of the Ordinary/Extraordinary Distinction
Courts initially characterized life-prolonging measures as either or-
dinary or extraordinary care.4 1 The distinction rested upon "the idea that
ordinary care is simple and that extraordinary care is complex, elaborate,
or artificial, or that it employs elaborate technology and/or great efforts
or expense." 42 If the treatment involved ordinary care, courts were re-
and those in which the actions themselves constitute the cause of death. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass.
App. 466, 471-72 n.7, 380 N.E.2d 134, 137 n.7 (1978).
The institutional interest of the medical profession in a treatment case is inferior to the individ-
ual's right to privacy, and will rarely control by itself. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737-40, 370 N.E.2d at
423-24. Nevertheless, that interest is entitled to some weight in considering such a case, since hospi-
tals have a right to provide and offer optimal care to people under their control. See also Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc).
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering. Where the
performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice of the patient, or his family or
legal representative if the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf should prevail. In
the absence of the patient's choice or an authorized proxy, the physician must act in the
best interest of the patient .... Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis and with the concur-
rence of those who have responsibility for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all means
of life prolonging medical treatment.
Id. at 217, 741 P.2d at 684 (quoting Statement of American Medical Association Counsel of Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, March 15, 1986) (emphasis in original).
38 The life of every human being is under the protection of the law, and cannot be lawfully taken
by himself, or by another with his consent, except by legal authority. Commonwealth v. Mink, 123
Mass. 422, 425 (1877). Any patient refusing life-prolonging care can be attributed an "intent" to
die. A patient making an informed choice to refuse life-sustaining treatment must realize that a
hastening of death will result. In Saikewicz, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts distin-
guished the refusal of medical care from suicide, stating:
(1) [I]n refusing treatment the patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even if
he did, to the extent that the cause of the death was from natural causes the patient did not
set the death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own death.
373 Mass. at 743 n. 11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11.
Courts generally have agreed that refusing medical treatment does not constitute suicide. See,
e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 n.8. (D. D.C. 1985); Foody
v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 137, 482 A.2d 713, 720 (1984); Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n. 11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.ll; In re
Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 351, 468 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985). But see Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision
3lahing for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REv. 386, 405-06 (1981) (suggesting that courts' analysis in the
suicide prevention interest has been incomplete and precarious).
39 See Note, supra note 10, at 651-52 ("The states'parenspatriae interest diminishes in proportion
to the decreasing dependency of the children.").
40 See Rubin, Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment for Terminally Ill Incompetent Patients: Court Orders
and an Alternative, 19 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 19, 20-21 n.6 (1985) (stating that courts have rarely
found the state interests to outweigh the dying patient's rights).
41 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 48-49, 355 A.2d 647, 667-68, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738; 370 N.E.2d 417, 424
(1977).
For a discussion of the distinction's significance in moral theology, see PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION, supra note 1, at 82 n. 114.
42 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 84.
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luctant to permit its termination.43  Significant interpretive difficulties
arose in classifying treatment, especially in cases involving intravenous
feeding.44 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Biomedical Research advocated an analysis focus-
ing upon the proportionate benefits and burdens of treatment as they
pertain to a particular patient.4 5
B. Barber v. Superior Court's Proportionate/Disproportionate Test
In Barber v. Superior Court,46 the California Court of Appeals signifi-
cantly modified the extraordinary/ordinary distinction of life support
treatment alternatives, noting that the use of the distinction "begs the
question." 47 Instead, the court focused upon the point at which medical
technology ceased to perform its intended function.48 Proceeding from
the premise that a physician has no duty to continue ineffective treat-
ment, 49 the Barber test determines "whether the proposed treatment is
proportionate or disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be gained
versus the burdens caused." 50
The Barber court rejected the idea that long-term use of artificial
feeding is substantially different from long-term use of extraordinary
devices, such as a respirator. 51 Any attempt to distinguish long-term nu-
tritional support resulted from what the court called the so-called "emo-
tional symbolism" of food and water.5 2 Barber stressed that medical
nutrition and hydration are closer to other medical procedures than to
typical human ways of providing nutrition and hydration.5 3 Therefore,
their benefits and burdens ought to be evaluated in the same manner as
43 See In re Storar, 52 N.Y. 2d 363, 381, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 266, 275 (blood
transfusions, like food, must be supplied to a terminally ill patient), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc.
1, 13, 426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (1980) (holding that a terminally ill woman only had right to remove an
intensive respirator).
44 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 83-84 (The treatment may be routine to the attend-
ing physician, but extraordinary to the patient, the lawyer, or presiding judge.).
45 Id. at 89.
46 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
47 Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. ("Although there may be a duty to provide life sus-
taining machinery in the immediate aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to con-
tinue its use once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel.").
50 Id. at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. The court stated:
Under this approach, proportionate treatment is that which, in view of the patient, has at
least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the
burdens attendant to the treatment. Thus, even if a proposed course of treatment might be
extremely painful or intensive, it would still be proportionate treatment if the prognosis was
for a complete cure or a significant improvement in the patient's condition. On the other
hand, a treatment course which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be
considered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless
for any significant improvement in condition.
Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
51 Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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any other medical procedure. 54 Courts have widely accepted the Barber
analysis of the right to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration. 55
C. Brophy v. New England Sinai
In Brophy v. New England Sinai,56 the Supreme Judical Court of
Massachusetts ruled that a gastrostemy tube could be removed from a
patient who was not terminally ill.5 7 The court noted that the extraordi-
nary/ordinary distinction may constitute a factor in the consideration; 58
however, its use as the sole or major factor tends to create a meaningless
distinction.59 Finding the treatment intrusive and extraordinary, the
court held that the individual's right to privacy outweighed the four state
interests. 60 Brophy seems to indicate that an individual's right to privacy
includes the ability to refuse any bodily intrusion, irrespective of immi-
nent death.
III. Overview of the Decisionmaking Standards
for Incompetent Patients
When the incompetent patient has failed to provide a prior expres-
sion of a treatment preference, it is necessary to devise a satisfactory de-
cisional standard to guide the surrogate. The optimal standard would be
one which focuses on the particular patient and remains free of the sur-
rogate's biases. In practice, this has not been the case. Courts have used
either the substituted judgment doctrine or best interests standard to
evaluate the propriety of withholding care from the incompetent patient.
A. Substituted Judgment Doctrine
The substituted judgment doctrine, the majority decisional stan-
dard,6 1 requires the surrogate to make the same treatment choice that
the incompetent would make if he or she were competent to do S0.62
The typical substituted judgment case involves a situation in which a pre-
54 Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
55 Following Barber, courts have viewed artificial feeding as a form of life support. See, e.g.,
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1141, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); In re Severns, 425
A.2d 156, 160 (Del. Ch. 1980); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); In re Heir, 18 Mass. App. 200, 207-08, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1984); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321,
374, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236-37 (1985); Delio v. Westchester City Medical Center, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677,
689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (1987) (en banc).
56 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
57 Id. at 425, 497 N.E.2d at 630. It appeared that Brophy, despite being in a persistent vegeta-
tive state and suffering from brain damage, may have continued to live for several years.
58 Id. at 438, 497 N.E.2d at 637.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638. But see id. at 442, 497 N.E.2d at 640 (Nolan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that withholding artificial nutrition and hydration constitutes death by starvation).
61 See Rubin, supra note 40, at 23.
62 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 132. The substituted judgment test originated in a
nineteenth century English case, Exparte Whitbread in re Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816),
involving a petition to draw from an insane person's surplus estate and apply the funds to support
his relatives. Lord Chancellor Eldon held the court must apply the property in such manner "as the
Court thinks it would have been wise and prudent in the Lunatic himself to apply it, in case he had
been capable." Id. at 879. The United States Supreme Court applied the substituted judgment
standard in City Bank Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945):
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viously competent patient may have provided some statements concern-
ing medical care prior to becoming incompetent, but offered no explicit
advance declaration against sustaining treatment.
1. In re Quinlan
In the Quinlan case,63 the New Jersey Supreme Court lacked reliable
evidence of Karen Quinlan's prior preferences, 64 but still granted her fa-
ther's guardianship petition, which sought the right to discontinue the
use of her respirator. 65 In purporting to implement the substituted judg-
ment test,6 6 the decision granted her father's petition on two grounds:
(1) his close familial relationship with Karen allowed him to accurately
determine what she would have chosen;67 (2) most reasonable persons in
her condition would not desire continued treatment. 68 A reasonable per-
son standard, however, is fundamentally inconsistent with the substituted
judgment doctrine.69 Furthermore, the court failed to offer empirical ev-
idence to indicate that most reasonable persons would have wished to
have the respirator removed. 70
2. The Massachusetts Approach
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 71 was cognizant of Quinlan's faulty sub-
stituted judgment analysis. 72 Nevertheless, it proceeded to further mis-
We hold, therefore, that where, as in New York, the court is to substitute itself, as nearly as
may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same motives and considerations as would
have moved her, the transfer is, in legal effect, her act and the motive is hers.
Id. at 599.
For an overview of the doctrine and its history, see Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and
the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1976); Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A
Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN LAw IN MEDICINE 131 (1985).
63 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
64 The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to admit evidence of Karen Quinlan's statements
when competent expressing her distaste for continuance of life by extraordinary medical procedures.
The court dismissed these remarks as "remote and impersonal, lack[ing] significant probative weight
. " Id. at 21, 355 A.2d at 653.
65 Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 671. The trial court ruled that Mr. Quinlan's love for his daughter
would distort his decisionmaking. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed and found his charac-
ter to qualify him to act as guardian.
66 Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
67 Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 671.
68 Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
69 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-61, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985) ("The question is not what
a reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under the circumstances but what the
particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself."); Weber, supra note 62, at 143 n.66
(The Quinlan majority-sentiment approach relies upon a statistical basis which does not justify a
conclusion about an individual.).
70 See Buchanan, supra note 38, at 393.
71 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
72 Id. at 749-50, 370 N.E.2d at 429-30.
The Saikewicz court first attempted to explain Quinlan's apparent abandonment of the sub-
stituted judgment standard and then proceeded to indulge in equally questionable reason-
ing when attempting to apply the standard to a more difficult set of facts. According to
Saikewicz, the Quinlan court lacking adequate direct evidence, properly considered the prefer-
ences of most reasonable people as indirect evidence of what Karen Quinlan would have
wanted. Thus, the Saikewicz court also failed to recognize that the genuine exercise of the
right of self-determination must allow the possibility of choices which diverge from what
most reasonable persons would prefer.
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apply the standard to an incompetent patient who had never been
competent. Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-seven year old with an estimated
I.Q. of ten and mental age below three years, suffered from terminal leu-
kemia.73 Saikewicz's guardian ad litem reported that the patient's condi-
tion was incurable and that chemotherapy would result in pain and
adverse side effects. 74 In affirming the guardian's recommendation to
terminate care, the court employed the substituted judgment standard, 75
even though there was no evidence of Saikewicz's preferences. 76 As a
result, the Saikewicz court undertook a speculative analysis; it attempted
to ascertain what an incompetent would prefer, "if that person were com-
petent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of
the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the
decision-making process of the competent person."' 77 The court attrib-
uted to an incompetent patient a brief moment of competence in which
to analyze his medical well-being and evaluate future treatment alterna-
tives. 78 It determined that Saikewicz's age lessened the chance of remis-
sion following chemotherapy and enhanced adverse side effects. 79
Therefore, he would have decided against the chemotherapy. The court
maintained that it based its decision "on a regard for his actual interests
and preferences and that the facts supported this decision."80
Despite the questionable Saikewicz analysis, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts adhered to the substituted judgment doctrine in
In re Spring.8' Earle N. Spring, seventy-three, suffered from senility and
end stage kidney disease, requiring hemodialysis treatment (filtering of
the blood) three days a week, five hours a day.8 2 Although both condi-
tions were incurable, Mr. Spring's condition was not terminal.8 3 While
competent, Mr. Spring indicated no preference to have life-sustaining
treatment removed or discontinued under such circumstances.8 4 His
wife and son, however, believed that if competent he would have wished
the treatment discontinued.8 5 The court noted that "[a]n expression of
Buchanan, supra note 38, at 393-94 (emphasis in original).
73 373 Mass. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
74 Id. at 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
75 Id. at 750-51, 370 N.W.2d at 430-31. But see Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Con-
ceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 374, 377 n.17 (claiming that the court
did not perform a substituted judgment analysis, but instead performed a patient-centered best in-
terests analysis). For a discussion of the best interests standard, see infra notes 94-153 and accompa-
nying text.
76 373 Mass. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
77 Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
78 See Weber, supra note 62, at 144 ("The image is that of an incompetent who becomes sud-
denly competent, but will shortly return to incompetency, and is aware of this.").
79 373 Mass. at 732-33, 370 N.E.2d at 420-21.
80 Id. at 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
81 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
82 Id. at 632, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
83 Id. The court noted that survival for five years would not be probable, but conceivable.
84 Id. at 632-33, 405 N.E.2d at 118. The court, however, noted that when Mr. Spring was com-
petent, he acquiesced to the dialysis treatments. Id. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120. Additionally, the
media reported that Spring had communicated to his nurses a desire to live. Dresser, supra note 75,
at 377.
85 380 Mass. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
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intent by the ward while competent was not essential."8 6 Rather, the
judge relied on the familiarity that Mrs. Spring and her son had with the
patient, concluding they were looking out for his best interests and not
motivated by financial considerations. 87 Such an analysis seems far re-
moved from the substituted judgment doctrine, which requires a clear
and convincing expression of the patient's wishes.88
3. The Failure of the Substituted Judgment Doctrine
The substituted judgment doctrine supposedly preserves the incom-
petent's right to self determination through the surrogate's decision,
given the reality that the patient cannot make a valid contemporaneous
choice.8 9 The substituted judgment doctrine often fails because a
patient's incompetence negates his or her right to bodily self deter-
mination.90
The subsituted judgment doctrine is inappropriate under the follow-
ing scenarios: (1) a patient who has been incompetent throughout his or
her life and never possessed the ability to assert any matters relating to
self determination; 91 or (2) a patient who was previously competent, but
never provided clear and convincing evidence about life-sustaining treat-
ment preferences. 92 Both scenarios allow the surrogate to infuse his or
her personal biases into the decisionmaking process and lose sight of the
patient's well-being. 93 In cases involving formerly competent patients,
86 Id.
87 Id. "[Tihe wife and son had only the best interests of the ward at heart .... [T]hey were best
informed as to his likely attitude. There was no evidence that financial considerations were in-
volved."). But see Buchanan, supra note 38, at 395 (citing amicus curiae brief for the American Soci-
ety of Law & Medicine at 15) (The relevant evidence suggested only that Mr. Spring would be unable
to live the active, vigorous life he previously enjoyed. In their brief, Professors George Annas and
Leonard Glantz argued that a decline in activity as one ages does not indicate that a person wishes to
die.).
88 See Dresser, supra note 75, at 378.
89 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSSION, supra note I, at 133.
90 See Buchanan, supra note 38, at 1081; Weber, supra note 62, at 140-41.
91 See Mooney, supra note 10, at 1082 (It is illogical to talk of self determination for patients who,
due to minority or disability, have never been competent.).
92 The President's Commission Report warns that the substituted judgment standard should
apply "only if the patient was once capable of developing views relevant to the matter at hand;
further there must be reliable evidence of these views." See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1,
at 133.
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981),
illustrates the application of the substituted judgment standard when such clear and compelling
evidence exists. Brother Fox, an eighty-four-year-old member of a Catholic religious order, under-
went a hernia operation which prompted a cardiac arrest and severe brain damage. As a result, he
remained in a vegetative state and required a respirator for life support. Id. at 370-71, 420 N.E.2d at
67, 438 N.Y.S. 2d at 269. Father Eichner, the guardian requesting removal of the respirator, con-
veyed Brother Fox's prior statements about the moral implications of the Quinlan case and extraordi-
nary care. At that time, Brother Fox expressed that he would not want any extraordinary care. Id. at
371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. Shortly before his hospitalization, Brother Fox
reiterated these feelings to Father Eichner. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. In
permitting the removal of the respirator, the Storar court found Father Eicher's only motive involved
respecting Brother Fox's wishes. Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. See Weber,
supra note 62, at 145 ("The Eicher case, with its uncontested testimony on precisely the question
investigated by the court, presented an ideal of practical simplicity. Any deviation from the Eicher
fact pattern, however, presents the court with difficulties.").
93 See In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 364, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985) (citations omitted) ("[I]n the
absence of adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it would be naive to pretend that the right to self-
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the substituted judgment doctrine often relies upon attenuated or
remote past statements, which are then improperly interpreted as what
presently constitutes the incompetent's personal treatment preference.
When the patient is a life-long incompetent, the decision may almost
exclusively derive from the whim and caprice of the surrogate de-
cisionmaker.
B. Best Interests Standard
In decisions involving life-long incompetents or previously compe-
tent patients that offered no advance treatment directive, courts have in-
creasingly recognized the shortcomings of the substituted judgment
doctrine and instead adopted a best interests analysis. This standard fo-
cuses upon which alternative will provide the optimal net benefits to the
incompetent.94 Application of the best interests test, however, has been
far from uniform. Some courts have considered the best interests of a
reasonable patient with a similar medical prognisis. Others examine the
best interests of the particular incompetent.95 In either case, courts have
recognized that the surrogate decisionmaker's evaluation may include
the right to refuse an incompetent patient's medical treatment.96
1. The Objective Best Interests Approach
In 1983, a Report of the President's Commission on the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
advocated an objective best interests analysis for an incompetent lacking
evidence of a prior treatment preference. 97 Under this approach, the
surrogate evaluates the patient's best interests based upon objective so-
determination serves as the basis for substituted decision making."); Buchanan, supra note 38, at
407.
People seldom hold universal views concerning handicaps and illnesses. Additionally, life and
death decisions often require instantaneous choice, further inducing an individual to rely on per-
sonal preference. See Annas, Quality of Life in the Courts: Earle Spring in Fantasyland, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Aug. 1980, at 9; Dresser, supra note 75, at 382 ("The current law's failure to examine and
weigh openly these considerations exposes it to charges of according insufficient protection to de-
fenseless incompetent patients, covertly assigning priority to economic and other third-party inter-
ests .. "); Note, supra note 21, at 714 (1987); Note, Live or Let Die; Who Decides An Incompetent's Fate?
In re Storar and In re Eichner, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 387, 393. But see In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 751
(D.C. 1979) (The District of Columbia Court of Appeals realized that "any imputation of a prefer-
ence to an incompetent person will, to some extent, be fictional." Nevertheless, the court accepted
the substituted judgment standard.).
94 See Dresser, supra note 75, at 383.
95 See id.
96 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc). The court
stated that the refusal to include death in a best interests evaluation may ignore reality. Id. at 220-21
741 P.2d at 687-88. The court cited as support In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984) and In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). Both of these cases held that a patient's best
interests could include receiving no care. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 815, 689 P.2d at 1375; Tortes, 357
N.W.2d at 337. For a discussion of Rasmussen, see infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. See also
Mooney, supra note 10, at 1083 (Even in its most objective form, the best interests standard does not
require treatment if a reasonable patient would refuse it.).
97 PRESIDENr's COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 134. The Commission advocates the objective best
interests analysis in cases involving (1) a patient that has not given thought to treatment preferences
or failed to communicate any thoughts; (2) life-long incompetents, whose subjective intent, if any,
cannot be ascertained with any certainty. Id.
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cially shared criteria. 98 The Report stated that such an analysis derives
not from the patient's right to self detemination, but solely as an effort to
protect the patient's welfare. 99 The surrogate should weigh factors such
as relief from suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning,
and the quality and extent of life sustained.100 These guidelines focus on
the contemporaneous interests of the patient and potential for future sat-
isfaction, but do not seek to reconstruct any prior preference.' 0 ' Addi-
tionally, the impact of any decision upon the incompetent patient's
family may be included in the best interests analysis.' 0 2
Rasmussen v. Fleming,103 for example, rejected the substituted judg-
ment standard in favor of such an objective best interests standard. 0 4
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld "Do Not Resuscitate" ("DNR") and
"Do Not Hospitalize" ("DNH") orders for a sixty-four year old nursing
home patient who remained persistently vegetative due to a degenerative
neural muscular disease and an organic brain syndrome. 105 Ms. Rasmus-
sen offered no expression of her medical preference prior to becoming
incompetent. 0 6 Also, no family member attempted to exercise her med-
ical decisions. 0 7 The court stated that a public fiduciary, appointed as a
decisionmaker, must adhere to the objective best interests approach
promulgated by the President's Commission Report.10 8 Because Ms.
Rasmussen would likely never have returned to a cognitive state, the ob-
jective best interests analysis would have concluded that any further
medical treatment in the absence of the DNR and DNH orders would
98 Id. at 135.
99 Id.
100 The Commission also recognizes the varying definitions of the quality of life. It intends the
analysis to determine the value that the continuation of life has for that patient, focusing upon actual
and potential life expectancy. Id. at n.43.
101 Id. at 135 ("An accurate assessment will encompass consideration of the satisfaction of pres-
ent desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the possibility of developing or regaining
the capacity for self-determination.").
102 To avoid abuse.., especially stringent standards of evidence should be required to sup-
port a claim that the average, reasonable person in the patient's position would disregard
personal interests (for example, in prolonging life or avoiding suffering) in order to avoid
creating emotional or financial burdens for their family or other people to whom they were
close."
Id. at 136.
103 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc).
104 Id. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689 ("Where no reliable evidence of patient's intent exists, as here, the
substituted judgment standard provides little, if any, guidance to the surrogate decision maker and
should be abandoned in favor of 'the best interests' standard.").
105 Id. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679. Dr. Stephen Cox testified that Ms. Rasmussen existed in a chronic
vegetative state with no possibility of returning to higher functioning. Id. at 212-13, 741 P.2d at 679-
80. Dr. William Masland, a court appointed neurologist, diagnosed her as being in a profound vege-
tative state from which she would never recover. Id. at 213, 741 P.2d at 680. Ms. Rasmussen died
before the case was resolved; however, the Arizona Supreme Court proceeded to review the case,
due to the public importance of the issue. Id.
106 Id. at 213, 741 P.2d at 680.
107 Id. at 220, 741 P.2d at 687. Due to the lack of family members, the court limited its determi-
nation only to whether the public fiduciary as guardian could vicariously exercise Ms. Rasmussen's
right to refuse medical treatment.
108 Id. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689. For a discussion of the President's Commission Report's criteria,
see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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have offered minimal, if any, benefits and would have postponed Ms.
Rasmussen's death.' 0 9
Such an objective approach, like the substituted judgment doctrine,
inherently contains the possibility that the decisionmaker may rely on
personal values rather than the patient's best interests. In applying a rea-
sonable person best interests analysis, courts have failed to clearly articu-
late what values should influence the treatment decision."10 Rasmussen,
for example, advocates the President's Commission Report's view that
the objective test should consider both the satisfaction of present desires
and any opportunities to regain or attain a right to self determination."'
The court, however, failed to offer any precise guidelines.
2. In re Conroy
Recognizing the conflicting interpretations of the substituted judg-
ment and best interests standards, the NewJersey Supreme Court in In re
Conroy 12 attempted to outline the factual scenarios under which these
standards should apply. Claire Conroy, an eighty-four-year-old nursing
home patient, suffered from numerous mental and physical impairments,
but still remained somewhat conscious of her surroundings." 3 Conroy's
nephew, as guardian, sought to have her nasogastric feeding tubes re-
moved." 4 The trial court permitted removal of the tubes, viewing Con-
roy's condition as burdensome to her. 15 The appellate court reversed
on two alternative grounds. 1 6 First, the court limited a guardian's right
to refuse treatment only to "patients who are brain dead, irreversibly co-
matose, or vegetative, and who would gain no medical benefit from con-
tinued treatment."' "1 7 Second, the court refused to allow the withdrawal
109 Id.
110 Those who argue in favor of incorporating reasonable person values in treatment deci-
sions must first define these values. For instance, they might be values held by the incom-
petent patient's family or guardian, clinicians who routinely care for such patients, general
or specific patient populations, institutional ethics committees, or customary interpreters of
the law's reasonable person standard, the judge and jury. Dignity and personal privacy
might have highly disparate meanings for members of these groups.
See Dresser, supra note 75, at 387.
111 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
112 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985). For an analysis of Conroy, see Note, In re Quinlan: One Step
Further, 24 Hous. L. REv. 383 (1987).
113 At the commencement of trial, Ms. Conroy remained in a semi-fetal position. Her ailments
included arteriosclerotic heart disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, bed sores, an eye problem
requiring irrigation, inability to control her bowels, inability to speak, and limited swallowing ability.
Nevertheless, she had some capacity to interact in her environment, through small movements,
moans, and facial expressions. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217. Conroy's doctors diagnosed her life
expectancy as a few months and lacked treatment which could offer her a cure or remission. Id. at
338-39, 486 A.2d at 1217-18.
114 Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216.
115 Id. at 340-41, 486 A.2d at 1218-19.
116 While the appeal was pending, Ms. Conroy died with her nasogastric tube intact. The Appel-
late Division found the issue of sufficient public importance to merit its consideration. Id. at 341,
486 A.2d at 1219. Several other cases have applied the "public interest" rationale to consider the
removal of life support systems where the person has died. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz.
207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (en banc); Barling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220 (1984), Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
117 98 NJ. at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219.
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of a nourishment device. 1 8 Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme
Court offered three alternative tests to guide a guardian's decision to re-
fuse care for the patient.
The Conroy court first recognized the need to respect a patient's
prior expressed preference not to undergo such treatment. 1 9 It listed
sufficient evidence of such an intent to include a living will, an oral direc-
tive given to a close relative, a durable power of attorney, any reactions
the patient may have expressed to medical treatment, the patient's reli-
gious beliefs, or the patient's pattern of behavior prior to medical
care. 120 The relevance of such evidence, however, varied with remote-
ness, consistency, thoughtfulness, or maturity.' 2 ' If the evidence meets
these threshhold requirements, the applicable standard is the substituted
judgment test.122
The New Jersey Supreme Court also realized that many patients fail
to offer advance declarations. Therefore, in such instances, the second
and third tests promulgated by the court involved variations of the best
interests standard: a limited objective and a pure objective test. 123 In
instances where some facts indicate that the incompetent patient would
reject treatment, but the evidence is not sufficiently compelling to pro-
voke reliance, the limited objective standard applies. 124 In order for care
to be withheld or withdrawn, the surrogate must prove that the net bur-
den to the patient of continued life "markedly outweighs" any "physical
pleasure, emotional enjoyment or intellectual satisfaction" that contin-
ued life offers a patient. 125 Where the patient has provided no evidence
at all of a treatment preference, the pure objective standard applies. 126
Under such circumstances, the court imposed the following require-
ments: (1) the burdens that the treatment inflicts upon the patient must
"clearly and markedly" outweigh the benefits to prolonging life; and (2)
severe, recurring, unavoidable pain would make the patient's life inhu-
mane. 127 In either of the two best interests tests, the Conroy court explic-
itly denied the surrogate's right to refuse care based upon a "quality of
118 Id.
119 The standard we are enunciating is a subjective one, consistent with the notion that the
right that we are seeking to effectuate is a very personal right to control one's own life. The
question is not what a reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under the
circumstances but what a particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself.
Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
120 Id. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1229-30. The court stated that it previously erred in Quinlan when
it disregarded evidence of statements made by Ms. Quinlan concerning life support treatment. Id. at
362, 486 A.2d at 1230. See supra note 64.
121 Id. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
122 Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
123 Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
124 Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The court noted that evidence which might be too vague or
remote to satisfy the subjective substituted judgment test (i.e., informal reactions to others' medical
conditions and treatment) may satisfy the limited-objective test. Id.
125 Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232. The medical evidence should relate to life expectancy, dura-
tion and consistency of pain with or without treatment, and possibility of relieving the pain through
measures short of terminating life support. Id.
126 Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
127 Id.
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life" determination.128 Rather, the two tests must focus upon the patient
in terms of pain, suffering, and possible enjoyment.' 29
The Conroy court limited its three alternative standards to an individ-
ual who fit Claire Conroy's characteristics-an elderly incompetent nurs-
ing-home patient with severe mental and physical impairments and a life
expectancy of less than a year.130 Since Ms. Conroy met none of the
requirements of the subjective or objective standards, the court refused
to allow the termination of her care.' 31
In his partial dissent in Conroy, Justice Handler warned that the ma-
jority too narrowly confined its best interests alternatives by limiting the
analysis to the physical pain which the patient was suffering.'3 2 Given
the increases in medical technology and pain relieving medication, he
warned that in many cases these standards may promote future adminis-
tration of life-sustaining care and prevent a natural death. 3 3 Justice
Handler advocated an analysis which incorporates the particular needs
and characteristics of the patient in question, including dependency on
others, personal privacy, dignity, and the ideal of bodily integrity. 34 Jus-
tice Handler, like the majority, fails to articulate the content and relative
importance of such values.' 35
3. Focusing on the Particular Patient's Best Interests
Under facts similar to Conroy, In re Beth Israel Medical Center'36 recog-
nized the utility of incorporating the incompetent's personal values or
traits, if any, when applying the best interests standard.'s 7 Beth Israel
128 Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33. ("We do not believe that it would be appropriate for a court
to designate a person with the authority to determine that someone else's life is not worth living
simply because, to that person, the patient's 'quality of life' or value to society seems negligible.").
This limitation differs from the President's Commission's recommendation that the best interests
standard include a "quality of life" assessment. See supra note 100.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231.
131 Id. at 385-87, 486"A.2d at 1242-43. The evidence that Ms. Conroy would have refused treat-
ment did not meet the clear showing of intent required under the subjective substituted judgment
test. Additionally, there was insufficient information relating to the benefits and burdens of her life
to meet either best interests standard.
132 98 N.J. 321, 394,486 A.2d 1209, 1247 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Handler warns that pain eclipses many other human values "that have a proper place in the
subtle weighing that will ultimately determine how life should end." Id. He notes that the Presi-
dent's Commission rejected pain as the sole criterion in a best interests analysis. Id. at 396-97, 486
A.2d at 1248-49.
133 Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247.
134 Id. at 395-96, 486 A.2d at 1248. Justice Handler notes that the person should be terminally ill
and face imminent death. Additionally, he states that at least one major organ of the patient should
have failed. Justice Handler recognized that the level of pain must be incorporated into the surro-
gate's analysis. Id. at 398, 486 A.2d at 1249 (citations omitted). See also Cantor, Best Interests, and the
Handling of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 565 (1985) ("It is unclear whether the Conroy
majority really intended to make physical pain a sine qua non in this context.") (emphasis in original).
135 See Dresser, supra note 75, at 387.
136 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (ex parte part).
137 Neither the courts nor the legislature of New York had ever directly addressed the issue of
when, if ever, a life-prolonging treatment may be withheld when the incompetent has expressed no
prior wishes. Id. at 515. The court noted that previously In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), had disallowed a mother's request to have
transfusions withheld from her life-long retarded son. 519 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The Beth Israel court
noted that this decision should not foreclose withholding of treatment where it would be humane to
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Hospital sought authorization to perform an emergency amputation on
Sally Weinstein, a seventy-four-year-old semi-conscious nursing home
patient who was brought to Beth Israel following a stroke.' 38 Ms. Wein-
stein was aphasic, which prevented her from communicating and under-
standing or decoding speech.' 39 Ms. Weinstein's only prior expressions
involved scant statements made to her sister that remaining in a wheel-
chair "was no way to live."' 140 The New York Supreme Court held that
the "focus must always be on attempting to ascertain what is or what
would be the particular patient's choice in the matter, rather than on any
broader societal or ethical interests which may be implicated."' 4' Addi-
tionally, the court adopted Conroy's criteria that burdens of sustaining life
"markedly outweigh" the benefits. 142 The court proceeded to list twelve
factors which integrated aspects of the patient's physical status, her ethi-
cal beliefs and societal concerns. 43 The list was not intended to be dis-
positive of the proper focus of a best interests analysis.144 The court
applied these factors and concluded that continued care of Ms. Weinstein
would be "simply cruel."1 45
do so. The right to die did not belong simply to those who executed living wills or with friends or
relatives to provide a clear statement of the patient's previous desires. Id.
138 Id. at 512. Following her admission, Ms. Weinstein suffered from an occlusion or clot of the
left iliac artery and vein, which resulted in a gangrenous spreading through her left leg. If an ampu-
tation did not occur immediately, she would likely die in a few weeks. Id.
139 Id. The court noted that she had little cognitive function; if Ms. Weinstein felt pain, she didn't
realize it. Id.
140 Id. at 513. Her sister vigorously opposed the amputation, fearing that the 'shock would kill
her.' Id. All the doctors, including Ms. Weinstein's internist, agreed that a patient in her paralyzed
and physically debilitated condition has only a poor chance to survive amputation surgery. Id.
141 Id. at 517. The court further required that a patient be suffering from severe and permanent
mental and physical debilitation and have a limited life expectancy. Id. Although Ms. Weinstein was
not comatose, the court found she did have the requisite degree of mental and physical debilitation.
Id. at 518.
142 Id. at 516. In such a best interests analysis, a clear and convincing proof standard is more
appropriate than a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 516-17.
143 The court listed the following twelve factors:
1. the age of the patient
2. the life expectency with or without the procedure contemplated
3. the degree of present and future pain or suffering with or without the procedure
4. the extent of the patient's physical and mental disability and degree of helplessness
5. statements, if any, made by the patient which directly or impliedly manifest his views
on life prolonging measures,
6. the quality of the patient's life with or without the procedure, i.e., the extent, if any, of
pleasure emotional enjoyment or intellectual satisfaction that the patient will obtain from
prolonged life
7. the risks to life from the procedure contemplated as well as its adverse side effects and
degree of invasiveness
8. religious or ethical beliefs of the patient
9. views of those close to him
10. views of the physician
11. the type of care which will be required if life is prolonged as contrasted with what will
actually be available to him
12. whether there are any overriding state parens patriae interests in sustaining life (e.g.
preventing suicide, integrity of the medical profession or protection of innocent third par-
ties, such as children.).
Id. at 517.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 517-18.
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Similarly, cases involving minors have applied a best interests analy-
sis which stresses family values, rather than a totally objective test.146 In
re L.M.R., 147 involving a persistently vegetative girl who suffered a "med-
ical catastrophe" fifteen days after birth,1 48 noted that the patient could
not have formulated a treatment preference. 149 The court recognized
that "[t]he right of the parent to speak for the minor child is so imbedded
in our tradition and common law that it has been suggested that the con-
stitution requires that the state respect the parent's decision in some ar-
eas."' 50 The court began with the presumption that the parent has the
child's best interests at heart,'-5 although it was not necessary for the
parents to chose the single best interest.' 52 The court limited this hold-
ing only to those patients diagnosed with no hope of recovery and ex-
isting in a chronic vegetative state.'5 3
In sum, when a patient was never competent or failed to offer an
advance treatment directive sufficient to meet the "clear and convincing"
evidentiary requirement for a substituted judgment analysis, a best inter-
ests standard should not focus upon "reasonable person" values. Any
best interests analysis applied to an incompetent should diligently focus
upon the particular patient and devise guidelines outlining when and
how subjective factors may be incorporated into the analysis.
IV. The Surrogate Decisionmakers for an Incompetent Without an
Advanced Directive
A. Overview
Aside from the questions of the types of treatment which may be
refused and the appropriate decisionmaking standard, right to die cases
involving incompetents without an advance treatment directive have also
fluctuated as to who makes the choice to initiate or continue life-sus-
taining care. The United States Supreme Court has recognized third
party standing to assert the constitutional rights of others in instances
when: (1) a substantial relationship exists between the claimant and third
party; (2) the claimant is unable to assert contitutional rights; or (3) the
146 See Mooney, supra note 10, at 1085.
147 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
148 Id., 321 S.E.2d at 718. Eighty-five to ninety percent of her brain tissue had been destroyed.
The neurologist, her parents, and the guardian ad litem agreed life support should be removed. An
ad hoc Infant Care Review Committee concurred. The DeKalb Superior Court enjoined the hospital
and physicians from interfering with the wishes of the child's parents and guardians to have life
support removed. Upon removal of the life support, the child died within thirty minutes. Id. An
appeal was heard for outlining guidelines as to such treatment decisions. Id. at 439-40, 321 S.E.2d at
718.
149 Id. at 445, 321 S.E.2d at 722. See also Mooney, supra note 10, at 1086.
150 253 Ga. at 445, 321 S.E.2d at 722. The attending physician must diagnose no reasonable
possibility of attaining cognitive function. Two physicians with no interest in the case must concur.
Although prior judicial approval is not required, it is available in the event of disagreement and
abuse. Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 723.
151 Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 723.
152 Id.
153 Id. The court found no legal difference between situations involving an infant and the incom-
petent adult who has made no living will. It extended its holding to such an incompetent adult
patient.
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third party protects against dilution of the claimant's constitutional
rights. 154 In deciding the incompetent's fate, the decisionmaking process
may involve three parties-the family, the doctors, and the courts.155
As mentioned, the best interests standard which focuses upon the
particular incompetent patient offers the optimal analysis in a refusal of
life-sustaining treatment.' 56 The decisionmaking process, therefore,
should rely upon those surrogates most capable of making such an analy-
sis: the family and physicians. Judicial review of cases involving the
withholding of medical treatment has proven to be an expensive, time
consuming and indeterminate process. 157 In fact, many of the patients
often have died before the final adjudication of the case.' 58 Courts have
themselves recognized the problems created by their active role and have
called upon the legislature to devise right to die procedures.' 59
Family members allowed to participate in the refusal of life support
should include only the immediate family or next of kin;' 60 a concise lim-
itation would eliminate the need for judicial guardianship procedures.
The family, unlike the judiciary, has suffered throughout the entire
ordeal.' 6 1 Judicial involvement may suppress familial evaluation of the
patient's needs, as it tends to suggest that the family has no control over
the loved one's destiny. 162
154 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972) (Baird, who had adequate incentive to
assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives, had standing to do so.);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (A married couple's rights may be negated unless
considered in a suit by someone with such a confidential relationship to them.); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) (The Association had standing because it and its members were practi-
cally identical.).
155 See Mooney, supra note 10, at 1087. See generally Note, Decisionmakingfor the Incompetent Termi-
nally Ill Patient: A Compromise in a Solution Eliminates a Compromise of Patient's Rights, 57 IND. LJ. 325
(1982).
156 See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
157 For an evaluation of the positive and negative aspects of active judicial review, see PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 159. The Report found beneficial aspects of such decisionmak-
ing to include (1) the process is a public one; (2) judicial decisionmaking is principled; (3) the judicial
process seeks impartiality; and (4) the adversarial process seeks to encourage proponents of oppos-
ing positions to participate. Negative features included (1) the process is lengthy and costly; (2) it
can create unneccessary strife in the relationship between surrogate decisionmakers and others; and
(3) it exposes ordinarily private matters to publicity.
158 See supra note 116.
159 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674, 692 (1987) (en banc); In re
Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 343-46, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220-21 (1985); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 822,
689 P.2d 1372, 1379 (1984) (en banc).
160 See Comment, Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment from the Incompetent Patient: The Need for Statu-
toiy Guidelines, 17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 445 (1986).
The President's Commission states that "[o]rdinarily this will be the patient's next of kin,
although it may be a close friend or another relative if the responsible health care professional
judges that this other person is in fact the best advocate for the patient's interests." PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 126-27.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (1985) (The statute designates the following family mem-
bers to refuse life-sustaining care for the incompetent: (i) the person's spouse; (ii) the guardian of
the person; or (iii) a majority of relatives in the first degree in that order. If none of the above is
available, then the choice to withhold or discontinue extraordinary care is made at the discretion of
the attending physician.).
161 See Mooney, supra note 10, at 1104. ("To the extent that anyone can perceive whether an-
other person is experiencing growth and fulfillment, those who spend the most time with the patient
are most able to sense whether the business of living is drawing to a close.").
162 Id. at 1107.
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The treating physician, like the family, maintains a special relation-
ship to the patient. The doctor possesses the professional expertise to
determine the available alternatives and their potential consequences to
the particular incompetent. 163 While the family and physician should
have the prominent role when an incompetent has offered no preference,
their responsibilities and the degree of judicial involvement should not
be uniform in all instances. In order to truly protect the patient's best
interests, the decisionmakers' guidelines must vary with the differing
prognoses and interests presented by incompetents existing in a persist-
ently vegetative or conscious state.
B. Deciding for a Permanently Unconscious Incompetent
Permanently unconscious patients lack all possible components of
mental life-all the thought, feeling, sensation, desire, emotion, and
awareness of self or environment.16 4 Physicians will diagnose a patient
as permanently unconscious only after vigorous medical evaluation.16 5
When such a diagnosis becomes clear, the best interests of the patient do
not include continued treatment. 166 Aside from the miniscule chance
of a medical recovery, 167 continued medical treatments to incompetents
in such a condition also involve two substantial, adverse side effects: (1)
the severe disabilities evidenced in the few patients who have actually
163 See id.; Note, supra note 155, at 335. (A physician has the obligation to treat the patient's
interests as paramount. Additionally, medical questions of highly technical nature may arise which
cannot be fully appreciated or understood by lay persons.).
164 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 174-75. In such a condition, only the patient's
vegetative functions and reflexes persist. Id. The Report, however, warns of three variables which
affect any determination that the unconsciousness is in fact permanent. First, the prognosis may be
falsified by future medical advancements; as a result, it is always a matter of degree based upon the
quantity and quality of available evidence. Second, the evidence regarding such a determination is
still quite limited and often specific to the particular patient. Third, a prediction of permanent un-
consciousness assumes that a future medical breakthrough would not permit a return to conscious-
ness. Id. at 176-77.
The Report also outlines five categories of permanently unconscious patients. In the first group
are patients in a persistent vegetative state ("PVS"), which often derives from head injuries or in-
tracranial hypoxia from cardiac arrest or asphyxiation. Although recovery is highly unlikely, PVS
patients may stay alive for an indefinite period and die of other illnesses contracted while incompe-
tent. The second group contains those who do not respond following a brain injury or hypoxia; such
patients usually die within a few weeks of the brain damage. The third group consists of end stage
victims of degenerative neurological conditions such as Jacob-Creutzfeldt disease and severe
Alzheimer's disease. These patients have a life span ranging from a few weeks to months. Fourth
are comatose patients with intracranial mass lesions from neoplasms or vascular masses. Patients in
this group only survive a few days or weeks. The final group consists of patients with congenital
hypopalsia of the central nervous system (anencephaly). This condition afflicts one in every 850
births. Id. at 177-81.
165 Id. at 181. (When improvement is believed possible, therapies will be intensive and aggres-
sive, seeking to reverse the unconsciousness and overcome any other existing problems.).
166 The primary basis for medical treatment of patients is the prospect that each individual's
interests (specifically, the interest in well-being) will be promoted. Thus, treatment ordina-
rily aims to benefit a patient through preserving life, relieving pain and suffering, protecting
against disability, and returning maximally effective functioning. If prognosis ofpermanent
unconsciousness is correct, however, continued treatment cannot confer such benefits.
Pain and suffering are absent as are joy, satisfaction, and pleasure. Disability is total and no
return to even minimal level of social or human functioning is possible.
Id. at 181-82.
167 Continued care would seem to derive from a small possibility that the diagnosis was incorrect.
Id. at 182.
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regained consciousness; and (2) the severe financial and emotional im-
pact the lengthy process has upon the patient's loved ones. 168
1. In re Quinlan
The Quinlan court articulated a decisionmaking scheme for perma-
nently unconscious patients which stressed judicial restraint. The New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that to require prior judicial authorization
would vastly intrude upon the medical profession and prove too cumber-
some. 169 Rather, health care decisionmaking should occur within the pa-
tient-doctor-family relationship.17 0 While the court recognized Mr.
Quinlan's right, as guardian, to assert the cessation of his daughter's life
support, it set forth the following procedural safeguards: (1) the attend-
ing physician must diagnose "no reasonable possibility" of the patient's
returning to a sapient state; (2) a concurrence by the family and guardian
to disconnect; and (3) an overview and concurrence of the diagnosis by a
hospital ethics review committee. 17' This ethics committee would in-
clude physicians, social workers, attorneys, and theologians.' 72 The
court compared the committee to a '.multi-judge court," protecting the
hospital and doctors by screening out improper motivations by the family
or physician.' 73
2. Washington's Judicial Restraint
Most courts have recognized that the best interests of a permanently
unconscious patient who failed to offer an advance treatment directive do
not necessitate prior judicial approval of a treatment refusal.' 74 The
Washington Supreme Court, for example, mandated judicial restraint in
168 Id. at 182-83.
169 70 NJ. 10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976) ("This is not to say that in the case of an otherwise
justiciable controversy access to the courts would be foreclosed; we speak rather of a general prac-
tice and procedure.").
170 Id.
171 Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
172 Id. at 49-50, 355 A.2d at 668-69 (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What
The Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1975)).
173 Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
174 Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 224, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (1987) (en banc); Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983) (citations omitted)
("Although there is not complete agreement among the courts that have addressed the issue in the
civil context, we agree with those which have held that requiring judicial intervention in all cases is
unecessary and may be unwise."); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 276, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984) (en banc); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 127-28, 660 P.2d 738, 745-46 (1983) (en banc). For
a discussion of the two Washington cases, see infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text. Cf In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). Torres' lack of family and his potential negligence cause of
action necessitated a court order. But the court noted in a footnote:
At oral argument it was disclosed that on an average about 10 life support systems are
disconnected weekly in Minnesota. This follows consultation between the attending doctor
and family with the approval of the hospital eithics committee. It is not intended by this
opinion that a court order is required in such situations.
Id. at 341 n.4.
See also Mooney, supra note 10, at 1088-89 (discussing that the permanently unconscious patient
does not have to be terminally ill to permit refusal of life support).
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In re Colyer 175 and In re Hamlin. 176 Colyer involved a sixty-nine-year-old
permanently unconscious woman sustained by a respirator with a prog-
nosis of no meaningful existence.1 77 In response to her husband's re-
quest to remove the respirator, Colyer affirmed the trial court's order to
do so.178 Analyzing cases involving formerly competent patients, the
court stated that judicial approval was not a prerequisite for the treat-
ment removal.' 7 9 Judicial intervention would be mandated when: (1) the
family members disagree as to the incompetent's wishes; (2) the physi-
cians disagree over the prognosis; (3) the patient is a life-long incompe-
tent; (4) evidence of wrongful motive or malpractice exist; or (5) the
patient lacks a family member to act as a guardian.180
In In re Hamlin,1 8 1 the Washington Supreme Court extended its judi-
cial restraint to cases involving life-long incompetents. Forty-two-year-
old Joseph Hamlin, blind and severely retarded since birth, persisted in a
vegetative state with the assistance of a respirator. 182 Since Mr. Hamlin
had no family, he needed a court appointed guardian to protect his best
interests. 8 3 When the physicians, the prognosis committee, and the
guardian agreed that termination of life support would serve the pa-
tient's best interests, absent a legislative directive to the contrary, Hamlin
concluded that the judiciary need not participate in the actual substantive
175 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (en banc). The court limited its holding to antidys-
thansia, removal of life-sustaining system from an incurable patient. See supra note 2.
176 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (en banc).
177 99 Wash. 2d at 116, 660 P.2d at 740.
178 Id. The Washington Natural Death Act did not articulate guidelines to discontinue in incom-
petent's life support in the absence of a living will. Id. at 118-19, 660 P.2d at 741 (interpreting
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.060 (Gum. Supp. 1984)).
179 In order to prevent judicial intervention, the court stated that all physicians must agree with
the prognosis and a close family member must use his or her best judgment to exercise the rights of
the incompetent. 99 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 660 P.2d at 746. "While we do not accept the Quinlan
court's view that judicial intervention is an encroachment upon the medical profession, we do per-
ceive the judicial process as an unresponsive and cumbersome mechanism for decisions of this na-
ture." Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 746. (citations omitted).
Colyer listed the procedures to be followed:
(1) A unanimous concurrence by a prognosis board, made up of the attending physician
and no fewer than two other disinterested physicians with relevant qualifications, that the
patient's condition is incurable and there is no reasonable medical probability of returning
to a cognitive, sapient state, or in the event of disagreement on theprognosis board, a court
decision making such findings by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) Court appointment of a guardian for the incompetent person [pursuant to statutory
procedure], including the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests
of the incompetent in that proceeding.
(3) Exercise of the patient's right to privacy and freedom from bodily invasion by the
guardian, if it is the guardian's best judgment that the patient, if competent to make the
decision, would choose to have life sustaining treatment removed.
(4) If required, a court determination of the rights and wishes of the incompetent, with a
guardian ad litem appointed to represent the incompetent patient and to present all rele-
vant facts to the court.
Id. at 137, 660 P.2d at 751.
180 Id. at 136, 660 P.2d at 750.
181 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (en banc). In Colyer, the Washington Supreme Court
noted in dicta that there are instances when judicial approval would be required in the decision to
withhold treatment. These scenarios included (I) life-long incompetents; (2) evidence of wrongful
motives or malpractice; or (3) the absence of a family member to act as guardian. 99 Wash. 2d at
136, 660 P.2d at 750.
182 Id. at 812, 699 P.2d at 1374.
183 Id. at 820, 689 P.2d at 1378.
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decision.1 84 If necessary, the court would resolve any conflict existing
among the decisionmakers. 185
3. Alternatives to Judicial Review
If the permanently unconscious incompetent has failed to provide
clear and compelling evidence of a preference, a medical ethics commit-
tee provides an effective alternative to court review in order to protect
the patient's best interests.' 8 6 In all instances, the committee should be-
gin with the presumption in favor of administering life support. The
committee's membership should integrate a variety of medical, legal
and societal perspectives into a review of the particular patient's best
interests.
If the permanently unconscious incompetent has no family, a court
should appoint a guardian ad litem to safeguard the patient's best inter-
ests.' 8 7 Given the substantially deteriorated well-being of permanently
unconscious individuals, judicial review of the guardian ad litem's
choice-if in concurrence with the physician's opinion of the treatment's
futility-would only waste judicial resources.' 88
C. Decisionmaking for a Conscious Incompetent
When the patient retains cognitive functioning, the question of who
should apply the best interests standard to a conscious incompetent be-
comes more difficult. The presence of some mental capability by the in-
competent enhances the state's interest in preserving life. The degree of
judicial authorization of any withdrawal or withholding of medical treat-
184 102 Wash. 2d at 820, 689 P.2d at 1378. Hamlin rejected Colyer's requirement of a judicially
appointed guardian for a patient with an immediate family. Id. at 819, 689 P.2d at 1378.
185 Id. at 821, 680 P.2d at 1378-79.
186 Ethics committees enhance the protection of the patient's best interests through the
following:
(1) They can review the case to confirm the responsible physician's diagnosis and progno-
sis of a patient's medical condition.
(2) They can provide a forum for discussing broader societal and ethical concerns raised
by a particular case; such bodies may also have an educational role, especially by teaching
all professional staff how to identify, frame and resolve ethical problems.
(3) They can be a means for formulating policy and guidelines regarding such decisions.
(4) Finally, they can review decisions made by others (such as physicians and surrogates)
about the treatment of specific patients or make such decisions themselves.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 160-6 1.
The Commission also surveyed hospitals and found that less than one percent have such com-
mittees. Id. at 161.
187 The guardian ad litem's duty involves discovery of all pertinent facts concerning the treat-
ment. The report should include the following evaluations:
(a) facts about the incompetent: i.e., age, case of incompetency, relationship with family
members and other close friends, attitude and prior statements concerning life-sustaining
treatment; (b) medical facts: i.e., prognosis for recovery, intrusiveness of treatment, medi-
cal history; (c) facts concerning the state's interest in preserving life: i.e., the existence of
dependents, other third party interests; and (d) facts about the guardian, the family, other
people close to the incompetent, and the petitioner: i.e., their familiarity with the incompe-
tent, their perceptions of the incompetent's wishes, any potential for ill motives.
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 223, 741 P.2d 674, 690 (1987) (quoting In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 133, 660 P.2d 738, 748-49 (1983)).
188 See Mooney, supra note 10, at 1117. (Given the endemic physical condition of permanently
unconscious patients, prior court approval of a guardian's choice is unnecessary.)
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ment from a conscious incompetent should depend upon whether the
patient's prognosis is terminal.
1. Terminally Ill Conscious Patients
In re Grant,'8 9 for example, permitted the cessation of mechanical
and artificial life-sustaining measures from a conscious twenty-two-year-
old woman suffering from Batten's disease with a minimal life expec-
tancy.1 90 In doing so, the Washington Supreme Court enumerated four
circumstances which are necessary to negate the need for judicial author-
ization.19' First, the patient's attending physician, in conjunction with
two other physicians, must determine with reasonable medical judgment
that the patient suffers from an advanced stage of terminal and incurable
illness with permanent mental and physical deterioration. 92 Second, the
legal guardian, if any, implements either (a) the incompetent's prefer-
ence while competent; or (b) if unable to make such a determination, the
best interests of the patient.' 93 Third, members of the incompetent's
legal family as designated by statute agree to withhold treatment.'
94
Fourth, neither the patient's physicians nor the health care facility object
to withholding such treatment. 195
A best interests analysis for the terminal conscious incompetent, like
the permanently unconscious incompetent, should determine whether
life-prolonging measures will enhance significant physical improvement
or merely prolong the dying process.' 96 In such cases, an optimal best
interests analysis requires implementation by the family with the concur-
rence of the physicians and a hospital ethics committee. These parties
are more apt to focus upon the particular patient rather than rely solely
upon a vague "reasonable person" standard. If the parties disagree, ju-
dicial involvement then becomes essential to protect and implement the
patient's best interests.
2. Non-Terminal Conscious Incompetents
More troubling questions arise in decisions involving a conscious in-
competent in a non-terminal condition, for a best interests analysis
would seem to favor life-prolonging procedures in such instances. In re
Spring,197 for example, applied a substituted judgment analysis' 98 and al-
lowed a request by Mr. Spring's wife and son to discontinue hemodialysis
189 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
190 Id. at 547-49, 747 P.2d at 446-47. Barbara Grant had a mental age of between two weeks and
one and a half months. Her limited capacities allowed her to respond to sound, smile or laugh at
inappropriate times, react to touch, and occasionally differentiate between people. Id. at 549, 747
P.2d at 447.
191 The court held that in the absence of countervailing state interests, a person has the right to
have life-sustaining treatment withheld in cases involving (1) an advanced stage of terminal illness;
(2) severe and permanent mental and physical deterioration. Id. at 556, 747 P.2d at 451.
192 Id. at 566, 747 P.2d at 456.:
193 Id. at 566-67, 747 P.2d at 456.
194 Id. at 567, 747 P.2d at 456.
195 Id.
196 See Mooney, supra note 10, at 1097.
197 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
198 For an evaluation of Spring's substituted judgment analysis, see supra notes 81-88.
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treatment for the patient's end-run kidney disease. 199 Although Mr.
Spring suffered from senility, the dialysis would have allowed him to live
a few months or potentially as many as five years. 200 In holding that it
should maintain ultimate decisionmaking responsibility for Mr. Spring,
the court enumerated a list of factors which guide an evaluation of the
necessity for a court order concerning the incompetent's treatment:
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the
patient is in the custody of a State institution, the prognosis without
the proposed treatment, the complexity, risk and novelty of the pro-
posed treatment, its possible side effects, the patient's level of under-
standing and probable reaction, the urgency of the decision, the
consent of the patient, spouse or guardian, the good faith of those who
participate in the decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to
what is good medical practice, the interests of third persons and the
administrative requirements of any institution involved. 20 1
The court, however, refused to decide what combination of circum-
stances would require prior judicial approval. 20 2 Spring noted that any
private medical decisions must be made in accordance with good faith
and good medical practice, subject to judicial scrutiny if good faith or
due care is brought into question in subsequent litigation. 20 3 The court
stated that the concurrence of qualified hospital consultants concerning
the treatment would be persuasive on issues of good faith and good med-
ical practice. 20 4
Absent an evidence of the patient's wishes, society should favor ad-
ministration of life-prolonging procedures to the conscious non-terminal
incompetent. Termination of care should occur only upon a clear and
compelling showing that the treatment is contrary to the patient's best
interests. Given the increased state interests for such a patient's well-
being, judicial authorization should be a prerequisite. The evidence
before the court must clearly prove that the life-prolonging treatment
will only induce further suffering without providing the patient any sig-
nificant benefits.
V. Conclusion
Life-sustaining treatment necessitates deciding whether to undergo
continued medical care. The law delegates the decision to the affected
individual, regardless of competence. The authority it grants, however,
is not absolute; the decision must be consistent with certain state
interests.
199 380 Mass. at 631-32, 405 N.E.2d at 117-18.
200 Id. at 632, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
201 Id. at 637, 405 N.E.2d at 121.
202 Id. The court refused to critique these factors even under the facts before it. Additionally,
the court noted that changing medical technology may make the factors inapplicable. Id.
203 Id. at 639, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
204 Id. The court stated that subsidiary questions regarding the implementation of the decision
must almost inevitably be left to private decisions, but without immunity for actions taken in bad
faith which are greviously unreasonable. Id.
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Although the law shows no concern for whether the individual is
competent, the law does assume that the individual has made or can
make some expression from which the individual's decision can be in-
ferred. In cases involving patients that have never indicated a preference
for or against medical treatment, due to either incompetence or over-
sight, that assumption proves false. The law must delegate the treatment
decision to someone else, and the surrogate must evaluate the decision
not only in light of the state's interests and societal values, but also the
individual's best interests.
The proper persons to whom the law should delegate the treatment
decision are the patient's immediate family and attending physicians.
The proper degree of judicial involvement in the decisionmaking is a
function of the patient's consciousness and prognosis. In many cases,
courts should become involved only as a last resort when the decision-
makers disagree.
Steven M. Richard
